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Introduction
At a time of unprecedented global competition, 
increasing performance is an important objective 
of every company. In this context, identification of 
financial performance determinants represents a 
current research question and the large amount of 
work devoted to this topic shows an active interest of 
experts to find the answer to this question. The effects 
of ownership forms on financial performance of 
enterprises3 have been of particular research interest 
in the literature of corporate finance. Generally we 
meet with the statements that interests of managers 
and shareholders are not aligned, which causes 
problems that reduce a firm’s value and financial 
performance. After 1990, this issue has become 
current also for post-communist countries. Analyses 
are even more difficult and challenging as they are 
done in the environment of economic transformation 
with extensive privatization processes, which are also 
accompanied by many negative social phenomena. 
The aim of this article is to summarize published 
results of important researches on the topic of the 
influence of company ownership forms on financial 
performance and to point out the problematic aspects 
of this relationship in the environment of transition 
economies. 
Ownership forms and support 
for privatization theories 
The term corporate governance has a number of various 
meanings. The World Bank states that it represents 
“organization and rules that affect expectations about 
the exercise of control of resources in firms” (World 
Bank Development Report, 2002, p. 68). Another 
interpretation states “corporate governance issues 
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arise in an organization whenever two conditions are 
present. First, there is an agency problem, or conflict 
of interest, involving members of the organization 
– these might be owners, managers, workers or 
consumers. Second, transaction costs are such that 
this agency problem cannot be dealt with through 
a contract” (Hart, 1995, p. 678). It is also mentioned 
that “corporate governance deals with mechanisms by 
which stakeholders of a corporation exercise control 
over corporate insiders and management such that 
their interests are protected” (John & Senbet, 1998, 
p. 372). All the stated interpretations have something 
in common. Each of them points out that corporate 
governance difficulties exist; there is a necessity for 
systems to handle and limit the arising conflicts.
The effect of ownership forms or structure of the 
share capital on the financial outcomes of enterprises 
has been the topic of scientific conversations for more 
than 80 years. It began at the moment of publication 
of the classic research of Berle and Means, The 
Modern Corporation and Private Property. At the 
end of the 1990s the topic of impact had actually 
become popular also in post-communist nations. It 
was right after they had found the important role of 
the private sector in development of the economy. 
Presently in those countries they differentiate three 
kinds of enterprises in regard to ownership: state, 
private and those with foreign ownership.
The major facet of ownership structure is associated 
with a company´s shares and their concentration. 
If a high percentage of shares is held by a relatively 
few owners, according to Citak (2007, p. 231) a 
company´s ownership is considered to be highly 
concentrated. Although  every study examines 
various periods and different groups of countries and 
companies, the majority of the papers find a positive 
relationship between ownership structure and 
company performance measured by return on assets 
(ROA), return on equity (ROE), market to book value 
of equity (MBV) and more.  
State – owned enterprises (SOEs) also known as 
government-owned corporations are defined as a 
legal entity that is created by the government in order 
to take part in activities on the government’s behalf. 
Governments may either wholly or partially own a 
state-owned enterprise. In terms of state ownership, 
we meet with bigger diversity in points of view and 
opinions in academic circles. Based on De Alessi 
(1980) and his statement, state-owned enterprises are 
political firms with the public as a collective owner. A 
specific feature of these companies is that individuals 
have no direct claim on their residual income and 
are unable to transfer their property rights. Lately 
this has been considered inefficient and bureaucratic. 
One of the most unprecedented global functions in 
the last quarter of the twentieth century has been 
privatization. During the above-mentioned period, 
governments around the world introduced different 
forms of privatization regardless of their economic 
backgrounds, political orientations and ideological 
positions (Haque, 2000, p. 227). Since than many 
researchers have claimed that SOEs should be 
privatized and while supporters of privatization 
argue that privatization is the only way to bring 
about changes in managerial goals and lead towards 
a competitive environment, others argue that it can 
be accomplished by more gradual approaches. Public 
sector inefficiency is sometimes seen as a ‘stylized fact’, 
it appears from the empirical evidence that a change 
in ownership from public to private is not necessarily 
a cure for an under-performing organization. 
There are three theories that support privatization of 
State – owned enterprises (SOEs): 
1)  property rights,
2)  public choice, 
3)  agency theory. 
Bozec, et al. (2002) summarized each theory. Based 
on agency theory, managers attempt to maximize 
their very own advantage or profit rather than that 
of a business owner or company itself. However, 
managers in private firms are disciplined by a variety 
of outside control systems, such as the market for 
managers, and also by inner control mechanisms, such 
as compensation and rewards incentives (Cuervo & 
Villalonga, 2000). The property rights theorists argue 
that under state ownership property rights are poorly 
determined (Ramamurti, 2000). They concentrate 
on the marketability of property rights, threat of 
bankruptcy, and avoidance by the managers the 
searching for their own conveniences. These kinds of 
control do not restrict managers in SOEs; as a result 
it is highlighted that they are less likely to maximize 
profits. Another approach emphasizes the issues in 
the functioning of government. Managers of these 
SOEs are more concerned with maximizing their own 
power, their prestige, and the amount of resources 
under their control (as cited in Kim & Chung, 2007). www.e-finanse.com
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Performance of a private 
company vs. state-owned 
enterprises
A private company is a company whose ownership 
is private. In the literature it is specified that it is 
expected that private ownership guarantee superior 
corporate governance through the role of external 
owners in monitoring managerial performance and 
in ensuring a single-minded focus on profitability as 
the objective of the firm (Estrin, 2002).
Specifically, we raise the question of whether private 
enterprises perform better than state-owned and 
whether post-privatization ownership structures 
cause improvement in performance over a certain 
period. There is a question posed by Peltzman 
(1971), “If a privately owned firm is socialized, 
and nothing else happens, how the ownership 
alone will affect the firm’s behavior.” Review of the 
literature points out that the difference in ownership 
structure among companies may affect their 
financial performance. Some analysts reviewing the 
performance differences between private and state-
owned enterprises have offered various outcomes, 
yet generally these researches recommend that 
privatization of state-owned enterprises leads to 
better financial performance. Among those authors 
we can name Andrews and Dowling (1998) and 
Parker (1997). The analysis discovered a significant 
positive influence of private ownership, which is 
an essential condition of utilization of potential 
positive effects of the corporate legal form of 
ownership. Better financial performance of the 
private companies and non-significant differences in 
the performance of public companies of both legal 
forms of ownership verify these conclusions. In this 
paper we use the term “privatized firms” meaning 
previously state-controlled companies where private 
owners presently have control and the level of state 
ownership is reduced. By the term “state-owned 
enterprises” (SOEs) we mean those companies where 
state ownership is greater. It is important to state that 
corporate governance mechanisms vary around the 
world and can produce different ownership effects 
on performance of companies. Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997) have defined at least three kinds of mechanisms 
in the world economies. In Europe and Japan, there 
is much less reliance on elaborate legal protections, 
and more dependence on large investors and banks. 
In the United States and the UK, firms substantially 
count on the legal protection of investors, and the 
ownership structure is dispersed. In the rest of the 
world, ownership is typically heavily concentrated 
in families, in which the legal protection is weaker 
compared to the other types of ownership. As a 
result of such differences between certain corporate 
governance systems we can anticipate various 
relationships between ownership and firm efficiency 
and value. Empirical researches mentioned in this 
paper can be divided into three groups: 
1) studies that compare the relative performance of 
private and public firms, 
2)  studies that compare domestically-owned and foreign 
companies,
3)  studies that compare the performance of the companies 
in transition economies.
Kim and Chung (2007) reviewed these studies well. 
After assessing existing literature on the relative 
performance of private and public firms, they 
concluded that efficiency of private companies 
is considerably better than that of state-owned 
enterprises and partially privatized enterprises. These 
previous studies employed various sample data sets: 
from one country, from one industrial sector or 
from many countries. In spite of the difference in the 
information set, the outcome is incredibly robust and 
enough to generalize that state-owned enterprises 
usually tend to perform worse than private companies. 
Examination of the efficiency of state ownership 
forms ends up with fewer disputes in scholastic circles. 
Recently, SOEs have actually been traditionally 
criticized as ineffective. For example, De Alessi (1980) 
mentions that the certain feature of such a business is 
that a citizen does not have a direct right to receive 
residual income.
Ehrlich, Gallais-Hamonno, Liu and Lutter (1994) 
have given proof on productivity differences between 
state-owned and privately owned firms. They used 
data of 23 international airline companies of different 
(and in some cases changing) ownership categories 
over the period 1973-1983. They developed a model of 
endogenous, firm-specific productivity growth. The 
authors found a significant link between ownership 
and firm-specific rates of productivity growth. Their 
results reveal that private ownership leads to higher 
rates of productivity growth and reducing expenses 
in the long run and these differences are not affected 
by the degree of market competition or regulation. 
Their outcomes show that the change from complete 
state ownership to private ownership would increase 
productivity growth by 1.6 to 2 percent a year and 
costs would decline by 1.7 to 1.9 percent.
Some more studies of private sector versus public 
sector performance, for example by Davies (1971, 
1977), Boardman and Vining (1989), Galal, et al. 
(1994), Dewenter and Malatesta (1998) have reported 
higher efficiency in the private sector. On the other 
hand Caves and Christensen (1980), Millward 
(1988), Nelson and Primeaux (1988), Parker and 
Wu (1998), and others, have actually reported results 
more favorable to public ownership or no statistically 
significant differences. This variation in the results is 
caused mostly by the fact that the early studies had 
access to different and frequently somewhat limited 
data on firm ownership. We can conclude the main 
issues of early studies are that (Estrin, at al., 2007):
1)  studies rely on short time periods with observations 
concentrated immediately before and after 
privatization,
2)  studies use small and often unrepresentative samples 
of firms,
3)  studies are frequently not able to determine accurately 
ownership because privatization is still ongoing or due 
to the fact that the constant post-privatization changes 
of ownership are hard to detect,
4)  studies frequently combine panel data from various 
accounting systems. 
Majumdar (1996) examines differences in efficiency 
between government-owned, mixed, and private 
sector firms in India. In his research he used industry 
survey records and found that SOEs owned by the 
government have performance scores on an average 
level with values of 0.658 and 0.638, combined 
enterprises have scores of 0.92 and private enterprises 
have scores of 0.975. 
Megginson, Nash and Randenbourgh (1994) 
compared 61 companies from 18 countries in the 
period before and after privatization. The results of this 
study indicate that for most companies in the sample, 
there was an increase in profitability, efficiency, output, 
employment and payment of dividends. D’Souza and 
Megginson (1999) conducted similar research, but on 
a sample of 85 companies from 28 countries. Their 
results confirm previous claims except regarding 
increase in employment. Mohammed Omran (2002) 
evaluates the financial and operating performance of 
newly privatized Egyptian state-owned companies to 
see if the results vary among companies as a result of 
their new ownership structure. Egypt’s privatization 
program offers a unique post-privatization data of 
different ownership structures. Since most studies do 
not distinguish between different types of ownership, 
this article provides a new perspective on the impact 
of post-privatization ownership structure on firm 
performance. The study includes 69 companies that 
were privatized between 1994 and 1998. For these 
newly privatized firms, the study documents show 
a significant increase in profitability, operating 
efficiency, capital expenditures and dividends. In 
contrast, there can be seen a significant decline 
in employment, debt and risk even if the output 
shows an insignificant decrease after privatization. 
Research by Ab Razak, Ahmad and Aliahmed (2008) 
on the relationship between ownership structure 
and performance of the company was the subject 
of interest among academics, investors and policy 
creators, because of the key factor in understanding the 
effectiveness of alternative control systems in which 
public ownership serves as a control mechanism. 
Accordingly, this article examines the impact of 
alternative ownership / structure of company control 
on business performance of individual companies 
in Malaysia directly associated with the government 
and those unrelated to the government. Generally, 
it is argued that government ownership or state 
ownership serves as a monitoring device, which 
leads to better business performance, monitoring the 
specific characteristics of the company. Tobin’s Q is 
used as a measure of market performance, while ROA 
is to determine the extent of financial performance. 
This study is based on a sample of 210 companies 
during the period from 1995 to 2005. A regression 
model was used to determine the impact of ownership 
on the mechanisms of corporate performance. The 
findings show that there is a significant effect of state 
ownership on the performance of the company, after 
checking the specific characteristics of firms, such 
as size of the company, non-duality, leverage and 
growth. The findings are important for investors and 
policy creators, which will serve as a guide when 
making investment decisions. 
Wu and Cui (as cited in Zeitum & Tian, 2007) study 
the effect of ownership structure on a firm’s health. 
They found that there is a positive relation between 
ownership concentrations and accounting profits, 
indicated by return on assets (ROA) and return on 
equity (ROE), yet the relation with respect to the 
market value measured by the share price-earning 
ratio (P/E) and market price to book value ratio (M/B) 
is negative. Likewise, the contribution of government www.e-finanse.com
University of Information Technology and Management Sucharskiego 2, 35-225 Rzeszów
www.e-finanse.com
University of Information Technology and Management Sucharskiego 2, 35-225 Rzeszów
29 28
Financial Internet Quarterly „e-Finanse” 2013 vol. 9 | nr 2 Financial Internet Quarterly „e-Finanse” 2013 vol. 9 | nr 2
(state) and institutional ownership is significantly 
positive to company profit, while negative to the 
market value. 
Tian (as cited in Zeitum & Tian, 2007) offers 
another study carried out on 825 companies listed 
on the Shanghai Stock Exchange, out of which 513 
are with mixed-ownership and 312 private firms. 
He discovered that private firms perform better 
than mixed ownership firms. D’Souza, Megginson 
and Nash (2005) evaluated performance of 129 
privatized companies coming from 23 OECD 
countries, focusing on influence of ownership on 
relative change of ROS, sales and investments. The 
results show growth in profitability, productivity and 
investments after privatization. There is significant 
impact on performance of private and foreign 
ownership and level of capital market development. 
In the same period Boubakri, Cosset and Guedhami 
(2005) performed analysis of performance on 230 
companies from 32 countries.  They used regression 
analysis to measure the influence of macroeconomic 
factors, ownership and size of company on ROS, 
ROE and ROA change. Due to the reforms in selected 
countries there are differences in results among them, 
but as in other studies, results also show growth in 
profitability, investments and effectiveness after the 
privatization. The positive impact of transformation 
of 429 companies in China that were transformed 
from state-owned to Joint Stock Companies, were 
found in the research of Aivazian, Ge and Qiu 
(2005). Dong, Lanjoun and Lesink (2006) compared 
performance of 121 privatized companies before and 
after privatization with the use of regression analysis. 
They identified growth in profitability, sales and 
salary. They state that the main factor that influenced 
improvement was change in management and access 
to capital market. Hanousek, Kocenda and Svejnar 
(2007) analyze the effects of different types and 
concentration of ownership on performance using 
a large population of firms in the Czech Republic 
after mass privatization. Results indicate that the 
performance effects of privatization and different 
types of ownership are on the whole surprisingly 
limited and that many types of private owners do not 
generate performance that is different from that of 
firms with state ownership. The only improvement 
in performance was observed in companies with 
foreign owners. The authors also performed another 
study. Its main goal was to evaluate what economists 
have learned to date about the economic effects 
of privatization, focusing on the post-communist 
(transition) economies and China, with comparative 
references to other developing countries. The main 
reason why they focused on transition economies 
was the fact that those countries experienced major 
changes in the values of many relevant variables as 
they changed their economic system. It is stated that 
those countries carried out a major transformation 
that made the share of private sector in GDP increase 
from extremely low levels to between 60% and 90%.
Ongore and Vincent (2011) performed a study that 
investigated the effects of ownership structure on the 
performance of 42 listed companies in Kenya using 
agency theory as an analytical framework. Measures 
of performance were ROA, ROE and Dividend 
Yield. Using Pearson’s product moment correlation 
and Logistic regression, the study found that 
ownership concentration and government ownership 
have significant negative relationships with firm 
performance. On the other hand, foreign ownership, 
diffuse ownership, corporation ownership, and 
manager ownership were found to have significant 
positive relationships with firm performance.  
Similar evidence and researchers can be also found 
in the banking sector. Privatization of banks is part 
of many empirical studies on the topic of whether 
privatization improves performance of banks. Bonin, 
Hasan and Wachtel (2005) analyzed influence of 
ownership on performance and effectiveness of 
bank in selected countries. The results show that the 
most effective are foreign-owned banks and the least 
effective are state-owned banks. Baruník and Soták 
(2010) performed a research on Czech and Slovak 
banks using the stochastic frontier analysis. The 
authors tried to observe whether the statements that 
private firms perform better than state-owned can by 
applied also on banks and whether the cost-efficiency 
is influenced by bank ownership. They used data of 
44 Czech and 21 Slovak banks between the period 
of 1996 to 2005. The main findings of the research 
are that the structural influences are significant for 
both countries. Foreign-owned banks are bit more 
cost efficient than domestic private banks, state-
owned banks are significantly less cost efficient when 
compared to domestic private banks. 
There have also been a number of studies on 
emerging markets. Daqing Qi, Woody Wu and Hua 
Zhang (2000) made a study of Chinese companies 
and found out that the most beneficial for corporate 
performance is legal-person ownership, while state 
ownership on the other hand dilutes the performance 
of listed companies. It was stated in the study that 
companies with legal ownership tend to be also more 
profitable based on ROE figures. 
Ivashkovskaya and Stepanova (2010) came up with 
interesting findings - that the impact of ownership 
on the efficiency of enterprises is more significant in 
Russia and Eastern European countries compared 
to developed countries. In terms of this statement, 
Akimova and Schwodiauer (2004) performed 
research on 202 Ukrainian companies for the period 
1998-2000. They concluded that insider ownership 
is found to have a significant non-linear effect on 
performance, while outside owners do not have a 
significant effect on performance. The impact of 
foreign ownership on performance is significantly 
non-linear; it means that its effect is positive only up 
to a level that falls short of majority ownership. 
According to OECD principles of corporate 
governance it is incredibly crucial to make sure that 
in terms of state-owned enterprises there are well 
established clear and consistent ownership policy; 
governance is transparent with a certain level of 
professionalism and effectiveness. It is essential to 
acknowledge the rights of all shareholders and ensure 
access to all corporate information. In a number 
of countries state-owned enterprises represent an 
important part of GDP, employment and market 
capitalization. Their performance is essential to a 
great segment of the population and to the business 
sector and lays a role in overall economic efficiency. 
Overall corporate governance is additionally crucial 
for privatization as it makes ventures much more 
appealing to potential buyers.
The effect of foreign ownership
The effect of foreign ownership on firm performance 
has been an issue of interest to both academics 
and policymakers. Görg and Greenaway (2004) 
mentioned that the major challenging concern in the 
international business strategy is the outcome gained 
from foreign ownership of firms. The emphasis 
on ﬁrm-speciﬁc assets as the primary source of 
ﬁrms’ heterogeneity with respect to conduct and 
performance has stimulated numerous studies that 
seek to investigate whether multinational ﬁrms 
(MNCs), or their subsidiaries, perform better than 
domestically controlled ﬁrms. Existing business 
literature states that the reason why companies invest 
abroad is that they possess firm-specific advantages, 
which are not accessible to domestic companies in 
the host country. Such benefits might compensate the 
expenses of operating abroad and therefore MNCs 
display remarkable performance (Dunning, 1993; 
Markusen, 1995; Caves, 1996).
It is mainly accepted that foreign ownership plays 
a crucial role in firm performance, particularly in 
developing and transition economies. Researchers 
(Aydin, Sayim & Yalama, 2007) have concluded 
that, on average, multi-national enterprises have 
performed better compared to the domestically 
owned firms. It is therefore not surprising that in 
the last two decades there was increase in foreign 
direct financial investments especially in developing 
nations. Two major explanations have been put 
forward to explain high performance associated 
with foreign ownership of firms. The very first 
reason is that foreign owners are more likely to have 
the capability to monitor managers, and offer them 
performance-based incentives, leading the managers 
to manage more seriously, and avoid behaviors and 
activities that threaten the wealth creation motivation 
of the firm owners. The second reason is the 
transmission of new technology and internationally 
tested management practices to the firm, which helps 
to enhance efficiency by reducing operating expenses 
and generating savings for the company. 
There is an agreement among many authors that 
the foreign owner has positive impact on financial 
results of companies (Ivashkovskaya & Stepanova, 
2010). Positive impact on a company´s performance 
is explained by tighter control of managers from 
the side of a foreign owner. There are two studies 
that distinguish between privatized SOEs and newly 
created private firms. Sabirianova, Svejnar and Terrell 
(as cited in Estrin, et al., 2007) performed a study 
on almost all industrial firms in the Czech Republic 
and Russia and found that foreign start-ups are less 
efficient than existing foreign owned firms, but more 
efficient than domestic start-ups, which are in turn 
more efficient than existing domestic firms. Therefore 
results proved the above-mentioned statement that 
foreign enterprises are more efficient than domestic. 
A second study was done by Commander and Svejnar 
(2007). They used data of 26 transition economies 
and based on their results stated that domestic 
start up firms are less efficient than foreign owned 
firms but not significantly different from domestic 
privatized or state-owned firms. Among emerging 
economies, Willmore (1986) analyzes a matched www.e-finanse.com
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sample of foreign and domestic ﬁrms in Brazil and 
ﬁnds foreign ﬁrms have higher productivity and 
greater capital intensity. Studies that examine the 
dynamics of productive efficiency show that foreign-
owned companies improved their efficiency faster 
than domestic state-owned and private enterprises. 
The reason can be that foreign owners brought 
about a sizable increase in efficiency in the period 
immediately after acquiring the local firms, but later 
on the rate of change in efficiency has been on average 
similar in all the principal types of ownership of firms. 
Petkova (as cited in Chari, Chen & Dominguez, 2009) 
conducted a study using Indian plant level data and 
concluded that foreign-owned plants experience 
improvements in productivity three years following 
foreign investment.
The reasons for this positive impact are various. One 
of them is that companies equipped with foreign 
corporate shareholdings are endowed with superior 
technical, organizational, and ﬁnancial resources. For 
instance, Chibber and Majumdar (as cited in Douma, 
George & Kabir, 2006) found that the extent of a 
foreign ﬁrm’s control over a domestic ﬁrm is positively 
associated with the degree of resource commitment 
to technology transfer. Djankov and Hoekman (as 
cited in Görg & Greenaway, 2004) wrote that foreign 
investment is associated with the provision of generic 
(management skills and quality systems) and speciﬁc 
knowledge. Boardman, Shapiro and Vining (as cited 
in Douma, George & Kabir, 2006) used a sample of 
Canadian ﬁrms and found signiﬁcant performance 
differences among multinational enterprises or their 
subsidiaries and domestic ﬁrms. They attribute these 
differences to ﬁrm speciﬁc advantages (resource 
heterogeneity) and differences in agency costs among 
foreign and domestic ﬁrms owing to ownership 
concentration differences. Furthermore, Douma, et 
al (2006) presented another study conducted by Dhar 
on foreign-controlled companies in India which 
ﬁnds that most of these enterprises have business 
links beyond mere equity participation. They have 
technical collaborations, nominations of foreign 
directors on their boards, consultancy and marketing 
arrangements, trademarks, patent obligations, 
and managerial resource sharing. In addition to 
the agency cost and resource-based advantages, 
Wiwattanakantang ﬁnds that institutional factors 
such as investment promotion beneﬁts lead to 
performance differences between foreign controlled 
ﬁrms and domestic ﬁrms.
Globerman et al. (as cited in Barbosa & Louri, 2005) 
“report that once the effects of capital intensity 
and size are controlled for, MNCs operating in 
the Canadian market are not signiﬁcantly more 
productive than Canadian-owned ﬁrms, emphasizing 
that better performance of MNCs is primarily 
due to the high capital intensity and large size that 
generally characterize them. Kim and Lyn (1990) also 
found that MNCs operating in the US market are 
less proﬁtable than randomly selected domestically 
owned ﬁrms.” Barbosa and Louri (2005) performed 
a study in Greece and Portugal. The results show that 
ownership does not make a signiﬁcant difference for 
ﬁrms in Portugal, subsequently casting doubts on the 
hypothesis that MNCs perform better than domestic 
ﬁrms, probably because they have to compensate for 
their liability of  being foreign. MNCs operating in 
Greece are signiﬁcantly more proﬁtable than Greek-
owned ﬁrms, only if a speciﬁc measure of proﬁtability 
(gross return on assets) is taken into account and 
only when ﬁrms in the upper quantiles are compared. 
When net proﬁtability is used, ownership ties do not 
matter.
A study performed by Douma, George and Kabir 
(2006) has an interesting conclusion. Based on the 
results they stressed the necessity of disaggregating 
foreign ownership into foreign institutional and 
foreign corporate shareholding. According to the 
authors those two categories should be analyzed 
separately. The main dynamics governing the 
investments by institutions and corporations are 
different and impact of foreign institutional investors 
on company performance is not clear-cut. Their 
results show that the variable representing ownership 
by foreign corporations is positive and signiﬁcant, 
while ownership by foreign ﬁnancial institutions is 
not signiﬁcant. The signiﬁcant positive relationship 
of foreign institutions may indicate that these 
institutions are ‘tracking’ better-performing ﬁrms. 
They suggest that all future studies examining the role 
of foreign ownership in emerging economies should 
incorporate this distinction. 
The effect of privatization in 
the transforming countries 
The topic of privatization and impact of ownership 
on financial performance is currently discussed 
and analyzed in numerous researches. Specifically 
in the transforming countries there is a concern of 
whether private or state-owned companies have 
better performance. The transformation of the 
former communist countries from almost completely 
state-owned to primarily private is one of the most 
important events in recent economic history. Most 
policymakers expected privatization to result in 
improved economic performance and it all ended up 
in a deep recession period for the first three to eight 
years of the transition. Despite that, they belong to 
the fastest growing economies in the last ten to fifteen 
years.
The first studies concentrating on effects of 
ownership on performance date back to 1980, when 
authors Caves and Christensen discovered that 
private and state-owned Canadian railways perform 
equally efficiently. After 1990 studies have focused 
primarily on privatization and recent studies come 
up with results with different findings and numerous 
variations of outcomes from no significant effect of 
privatization on performance (Estrin, et al., 2007), 
to cautiously concluding that privatization tends to 
improve firm performance (Megginson & Netter, 
2001), to being fairly confident that privatization 
improves performance (Shirley & Walsh, 2000; 
Djankov & Murrell, 2002). The view that privatization 
could also be pivotal in the transition process was 
strongly advocated by proponents of the so-called 
Washington Consensus, which emphasized fast 
transfer of ownership via privatization. They believed 
that private ownership together with market forces 
would ensure better and more efficient performance 
of the economy (Lipton & Sachs, 1990; Blanchard, et 
al, 1991).
Frydman, Gray, Hessel and Rapaczynski (1999) 
compared the performance of privatized and 
state firms in the transition economies of Central 
Europe, using data of 506 midsize manufacturing 
companies in 1994, comparing four measures of firm 
performance – sales revenues, employment, labor 
productivity and material costs per unit of revenue. 
The authors found that privatized firms perform better 
compared to the state owned enterprises. However, 
the performance improvement is concentrated in 
revenue improvement (not cost reduction) in firms 
privatized to outside owners.
Conclusions
The research and literature review of the influence 
of ownership structure on performance has shown 
varied results. Generally it can be stated, based on 
most of the research, that private companies show 
better performance than state-owned companies. 
Foreign ownership has a positive impact on 
companies and performance, which also applies in 
the banking sector. Even though there are numerous 
researchers considering this topic, there is still a lack 
of research based in Slovakia and in Slovak companies. 
Privatization in Slovakia was an important part of 
country development and the results could provide 
significant information for both academic and 
corporate sectors. 
We consider it very important to further develop 
this kind of research by analyzing the differences 
in impact of forms of ownership on performance 
in the selected industries and also by more detailed 
examination of the structure of ownership within its 
defined forms. This also leaves space for research in 
the environment of transition economies.
References
Ab Razak, N. H., Ahmad, R., Aliahmed, H. J. (2008). 
Government Ownership and Performance Analysis of 
Listed Companies in Malaysia. Corporate Ownership & 
Control, 6(2), 434-442. Retrieved from 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=1252072. 
Aivazian A. V., Ge Y., Qiu, J. (2005). Debt Maturity 
Structure and Firm Investment. Financial Management, 
34(4), 107-199.
Akimova, I., Schwodiauer, G. (2004). Performance Effects 
of Trust in Commercial Courts of Ukrainian SMEs. Trust 
and Entrepreneurship- A West- East Perspective.
Andrews, W. A., Dowling, M. J. (1998). Explaining 
Performance Changes in Newly Privatized Firms. Journal 
of Management Studies, 35, 601-618. DOI: 10.1111/1467-
6486.00111
Aydin, N., Sayim, M., Yalama, A. (2007). Foreign 
Ownership and Firm Performance: Evidence from Turkey. 
International Research Journal of Finance and Economics, 
11, 104-111.
Barbosa, N., Louri, H. (2005). Corporate Performance: 
Does Ownership Matter? A Comparison of Foreign and 
Domestic Owned Firms in Greece and Portugal. Review of 
Industrial Organization, Springer, 27(1), 73-102. Retrieved 
from:  
http://repositorium.sdum.uminho.pt/
bitstream/1822/11259/ 1/wp26.pdf. 
Baruník, J., Soták, B. (2010). Influence of Different 
Ownership Forms on Efficiency of Czech and Slovak 
Banks: Stochastic Frontier Approach. Politická ekonomie, 
2, 207-224.www.e-finanse.com
University of Information Technology and Management Sucharskiego 2, 35-225 Rzeszów
www.e-finanse.com
University of Information Technology and Management Sucharskiego 2, 35-225 Rzeszów
33 32
Financial Internet Quarterly „e-Finanse” 2013 vol. 9 | nr 2 Financial Internet Quarterly „e-Finanse” 2013 vol. 9 | nr 2
Blanchard, et al. (1991). Reform in Eastern Europe. 
Cambridge, Mass. and London: MIT Press. 
ISBN 0-262-02328-8.
Bonin, J. P., Hasan, I., Wachtel, P. (2005). Bank 
Performance, Efficiency and Ownership in Transition 
Countries. Journal of Banking & Finance, 29(1), 31-53. 
Boubakri, N., Cosset, J. C., Guedhami, O. (2005). 
Postprivatization Corporate Governance: the Role of 
Ownership Structure and Investor Protection. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 76, 369-399.
Bozec, R., Breton, G., Cote, L. (2002). The Performance 
of State owned Enterprises  Revisited.  Financial  
Accountability  and Management, 18(4), 383-407.
Citak, L. (2007). The Impact of Ownership Structure on 
Company Performance; A Panel Data Analysis on Istanbul 
Stock Exchange Listed (ISE-100) Companies. International 
Research Journal of Finance and Economics, 9, 231-245. 
Retrieved from: 
http://www.eurojournals.com/Pages%20from%20irjfe%20
9-17%20levent.pdf. 
Commander, S., Svejnar, J. (2007). Do Institutions, 
Ownership, Exporting and Competition Explain Firm 
Performance? Evidence from 26 Transition Countries. IZA 
Discussion Papers, No. 2637. Retrieved from: 
http://www.econstor.eu/
bitstream/10419/33877/1/528141589.pdf. 
Cuervo, A., Villalonga, B. (2000). Explaining the Variance 
in the Performance Effects of Privatization. Academy of 
Management Review, 25(3), 581-590. Retrieved from: 
http://www.people.hbs.edu/ bvillalonga/AMR.pdf. 
De Alessi, L. (1980). The Economics of Property Rights: A 
Review of the Evidence. Research in Law and Economics, 
2, 1-47.
Djankov, S., Murrell, P. (2002). Enterprise Restructuring 
in Transition: A Quantitative Survey. Journal of Economic 
Literature, 40(3), 739-792.
Douma, S., George, R., Kabir, R. (2006). Foreign and 
Domestic Ownership, Business Groups, and Firm 
Performance: Evidence From a Large Emerging Market. 
Strategic Management Journal, 27(7), 637-657.
D’Souza, J., Megginson, W. (1999). The Financial and 
Operating Performance of Privatized Firms During the 
1990s. Journal of Finance. 54(4), 1397-1424. Retrieved 
from: 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/corporateaffairs/
corporategovernanceofstateownedenterprises/1929641.pdf. 
D’Souza, J., Megginson, W., Nash, R. (2005). Effect  of 
Institutional and Firm-Specific Characteristics on Post-
privatization Performance: Evidence from Developing 
Countries. Journal of Corporate Finance, 11, 747-766. 
Retrieved from: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ papers.cfm?abstract_
id=621762. 
Ehrlich, I., Gallais-Hamonno, G., Liu Z., Lutter, R. (1994). 
Productivity Growth and Firm Ownership: An Analytical 
and Empirical Investigation. Journal of Political Economy, 
102(5), 1006-1038. Retrieved from: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
961463. 
Estrin, S. (2002). Competition and Corporate Governance 
in Transition. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 16(1), 
101-124.
Estrin, S., Hanousek, J., Kocenda, E., Svejnar, J. (2007). 
Effects of Privatization and Ownership in Transition 
Economies. The World Bank – Policy Research Working 
Paper, 4811.
Frydman, R., Gray W. CH., Hessel M., Rapaczynski, A. 
(1999). When Does Privatization Work? The Impact 
of Private Ownership on Corporate Performance in 
Transition Economies. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
114(4), 1153-1191.
Görg, H., Greenaway, D. (2004). Much Ado about 
Nothing? Do Domestic Firms Really Benefit from Foreign 
Direct Investment? World Bank Research Observer, 19(2), 
171-197. Retrieved from: 
http://econ.core.hu/comppress/D22b.pdf. 
Haque, M. S. (2000). Privatization in Developing 
Countries: Formal Causes, Critical Reasons and Adverse 
Impacts. International Political Science Review, 25(2), 
227–240. Retrieved from: 
http://profile.nus.edu.sg/fass/polhaque/privatization.pdf. 
Hanousek, J., Kocenda, E., Svejnar, J. (2007). Origin 
and Concentration. Corporate Ownership, Control and 
Performance in Firms After Privatization. Economics of 
Transition, 15(1), 1-31. Retrieved from: 
http://home.cerge-ei.cz/hanousek/jel_survey/Table%203/
Hanousek,%20 Kocenda,%20and%20Svejnar%20(2007).
pdf. 
Hart, O. (1995). Corporate Governance: Some Theory and 
Implications. The Economic Journal, 105(430), 678-689. 
Retrieved from: 
http://www1.fee.uva.nl/fm/courses/1_multipart_xF8FF_ 
3_Hart%20EJ%2095%20Corp%20Gov.pdf. 
Chari, A., Chen, W., Dominguez, K. (2009). Foreign 
Ownership and Firm Performance: Emerging Market 
Acquisitions in the United States. NBER Working Paper 
No. 14786.
Ivashkovskaya, I., Stepanova, A. (2011). Does Strategic 
Corporate Performance Depend on Corporate Financial 
Architecture? Empirical study of European, Russian and 
Other Emerging Market’s Firms. Journal of Management 
and Governance, 15, 603-616. DOI 10.1007/s10997-010-
9132-7.
John, K., Senbet, L. (1998). Corporate Governance and 
Board Effectiveness.  Journal of Banking and Finance, 
22, 371-403. Retrieved from: http://www.rhsmith.umd.
edu/faculty/ lsenbet/lemmas%20papers/corporate%20
governance%20and%20board%20effectiveness.pdf
Kim,  J., Chung, H. (2007). Empirical Study on the 
Performance of State-owned Enterprises and the 
Privatizing Pressure: The Case of Korea. Retrieved from: 
http://regulation.upf.edu/utrecht-08-papers/jkim.pdf. 
Kim, W. S., Lyn, E. O. (1990). FDI theories and the 
performance of foreign multinationals operating in the 
U.S. Journal of International Business Studies,  21(1). 
Lipton, D., Sachs, J. (1990). Privatization in Eastern 
Europe: The Case of Poland. Brookings Papers on 
Economic Activity, 2, 293-333.
Majumdar, S. K. (1996). Assessing Comparative Efficiency 
of the State-Owned, Mixed, and Private Sectors in Indian 
Industry. Public Choice, 96, 1-24. Retrieved from: 
http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/
handle/2027.42/45522/11127_2004_Article_106981.pdf;j
sessionid=45FB1D090DB118405E7ED9B99BC37EBE?se
quence=1. 
Megginson, W. L., Netter, J. M. (2001). From State to 
Market: A Survey of Empirical Studies on Privatization. 
Journal of Economic Literature, 39, 321-389. Retrieved 
from: 
http://www.marketobservation.com/blogs/media/blogs/c_
f/20070304OverviewPrivatizationWorldBank.pdf. 
Megginson, W. L., Nash, R. C., Randenborgh, M. V. 
(1994). The Financial and Operating Performance of 
Newly Privatized Firms: International Empirical Analysis. 
The Journal of Finance, 49(2), 403-452. DOI: 10.1111/
j.1540-6261.1994.tb05147.x
OECD (2004). OECD Principles of Corporate 
Governance. Retrieved from: 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/corporateaffairs/
corporategovernanceprinciples/31557724.pdf. 
Omran, M. (2002). The Performance of State-Owned 
Enterprises and Newly privatized Firms: Empirical 
Evidence from Egypt. Nota di Lavoro, 73. Retrieved from: 
http://www.feem.it/userfiles/attach/Publication/NDL2002/
NDL2002-073.pdf.
Ongore, Vincent, O. (2011). Corporate Governance and 
Performance: An Analysis of Ownership Structure in 
Kenya. International Journal of Governance, 1(2), 216-236.
Parker, D. (1997). Price Cap Regulation, Profitability and 
Returns to Investors in the UK Regulated Industries. 
Utilities Policy, 6, 303-315. DOI: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0957-1787(97)00027-1.
Peltzman, S. (1971). Pricing in Public and Private 
Enterprises: Electric Utilities in the United States. Journal 
of Law and Economics, 14(1), 109-147.
Qi, D., Wu, W., Zhang, H. (2000). Shareholding Structure 
and Corporate Performance of Partially Privatized Firms: 
Evidence from Listed Chinese Companies. Pacific-Basin 
Finance Journal, 8(5), 587-610. Retrieved from: 
http://home.cergeei.cz/hanousek/jel_survey/ Table%204/
panel_B/ QiWuZhang_PBFJ2000.pdf.  
Ramamurti, R. (2000). A Multilevel Model of Privatization 
in Emerging Economies. Academy of Management 
Review, 25, 525-550.
Shirley, M. M., Walsh, P. (2000). Public Private Ownership: 
The Current State of the Debate. World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper No. 2420. 
Shleifer, A., Vishny, R. W. (1997). A Survey of Corporate 
Governance. Journal of Finance, 52(2), 737-783. Retrieved 
from: 
http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/shleifer/files/ 
SurveyCorpGov.pdf. 
Willmore, L. N. (1986). The Comparative Performance 
of Foreign and Domestic Firms in Brazil. World 
Development, 14(4), 489-502. Retrieved from: 
http://larrywillmore.net/WD_1986.pdf. 
Zeitum, R., Tian, G. G. (2007). Does Ownership Affect a 
Firm’s Performance and Default Risk in Jordan? Corporate 
Governance, 7(1), 66 – 82.